International trade and the equilibrium rate of unemployment in a Heckscher-Ohlin world economy by HOON, Hian Teck
Singapore Management University
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
Research Collection School Of Economics School of Economics
1994
International trade and the equilibrium rate of
unemployment in a Heckscher-Ohlin world
economy
Hian Teck HOON
Singapore Management University, hthoon@smu.edu.sg
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/10168739400080010
Follow this and additional works at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research
Part of the Economics Commons
This Journal Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Economics at Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management
University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Research Collection School Of Economics by an authorized administrator of Institutional Knowledge
at Singapore Management University. For more information, please email libIR@smu.edu.sg.
Citation
HOON, Hian Teck. International trade and the equilibrium rate of unemployment in a Heckscher-Ohlin world economy. (1994).
International Economic Journal. 8, (2), 13-32. Research Collection School Of Economics.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/433
Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at
http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=riej20
Download by: [Singapore Management University] Date: 02 June 2017, At: 00:58
International Economic Journal
ISSN: 1016-8737 (Print) 1743-517X (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/riej20
International Trade and the Equilibrium Rate
of Unemployment in a Heckscher-Ohlin World
Economy
Dr. Hian Teck Hoon
To cite this article: Dr. Hian Teck Hoon (1994) International Trade and the Equilibrium Rate of
Unemployment in a Heckscher-Ohlin World Economy, International Economic Journal, 8:2, 13-32
To link to this article:  http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10168739400000010
Published online: 29 May 2012.
Submit your article to this journal 
Article views: 21
View related articles 
Published in International Economic Journal, 1994 January, Volume 8, Issue 2, Pages 13-32
http://doi.org/10.1080/10168739400080010
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC JOURNAL 
Volume 8, Number 2, Summer 1994 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND THE EQUILIBRIUM RATE OF 
UNEMPLOYMENT IN A HECKSCHER-OHLIN WORLD ECONOMY 
HIAN TECK HOON* 
National University of Singapore 
This paper develops a (stylized Asia-America) Heckscher-Ohlin world economy in 
which the equilibrium rate of unemployment is endogenous. We examine the impact 
of various economic shocks on unemployment in the global economy. Harrod-neutral 
or Hicks-neutral technical progress across all industries in Asia leads to a terms of 
trade improvement for America but raises America's unemployment rate. Introducing 
a third country such as the block of former socialist economies results in higher 
unemployment for both Asia and America. Protection in America lowers American 
equilibrium unemployment but raises Asia's unemployment. [E24] 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Plagued by over a decade long experience of high unemployment in the OECD 
countries, macroeconomic theorists have developed in recent years a collection of 
models of the theory of the equilibrium rate of unemployment.' In these models, real 
factors including both demand and supply parameters impact upon the evolution of 
the equilibrium rate of unemployment. This equilibrium unemployment is also known 
as the natural rate of unemployment in the standard Phillips curve view of the 
economics of booms and slumps. In that view, business cycle fluctuations are 
interpreted as deviations of the unemployment rate around a largely exogenous natural 
rate. The worldwide depression of the eighties, however, has spurred economists to 
think of factors which cause the natural or equilibrium rate of unemployment to 
endogenously vary. In an oft-cited piece of work by Bruno and Sachs (1985), the 
authors link the macroeconomic problems of the Western economies, in particular 
Europe, to the oil shocks of the seventies. By alluding to a notion of real wage 
rigidity, they show how negative supply shocks in the world economy drive up the 
equilibrium rate of unemployment in the oil-importing economies. 
In Hoon and Phelps (1992), we integrate some early work pointing to a new 
paradigm of the economics of the long swing in economic activity to show rigorously 
*I wish to thank, without implicating, Professors John Donaldson, Ronald Findlay, Glenn 
Hubbard, and especially Edmund Phelps for useful discussions and comments. I am also 
grateful to two anonymous referees for their useful comments. 
'See the collection of insider-outsider models in Lindbeck and Snower (1988), the union 
model of McDonald and Solow (1981), and the efficiency-wage models of Hoon and Phelps 
(1992) as well as Layard, Nickel1 and Jackman (1991). Layard, et al. (1991) also present useful 
empirical facts regarding unemployment in the OECD countries in the last three decades. 
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how the natural rate of unemployment can be endogeni~ed.~ In particular, we draw 
upon an incentive-wage theory of the labor market to derive an equilibrium wage or 
pseudo-labor supply locus which, in the Marshallian employment-real wage plane, 
may be interpreted as a whole locus of the natural rates of unemployment. By taking 
into account the structure of the goods market we show how an economy-wide labor 
demand locus can be derived which, juxtaposed against the equilibrium wage locus, 
determines the unique general-equilibrium rate of unemployment. Various real factors 
are shown to impinge upon the evolution of the natural rate of unemployment. 
Looking at the economic experience of the East Asian economies, one could 
perhaps find some supporting evidence of such a theory at the global level since the 
secular decline of the rates of unemployment of the Newly Industrializing Countries 
(NICs) in the last three decades must surely be largely a decline of the equilibrium 
rate of ~nemployment.~ Empirical work that has studied the economic performance of 
these economies invariably alludes to the importance of an export-led growth based 
upon the export of labor-intensive goods to the world market (see, for example, 
Krueger, 1983). It is at least a reasonable hypothesis that the ability of these 
economies to export labor-intensive goods to the world market explains most, if not 
all, of the secular decline in unemployment rates. 
While such is the impression of the remarkable macroeconomic performance of 
these economies, standard trade theory has no predictive power regarding the impact 
of free trade on the equilibrium rate of unemployment since it assumes at the outset 
full employment. There are, however, some interesting issues to examine in the global 
economy in the nineties for which a theory explaining the endogenous response of the 
equilibrium rate of unemployment is needed. What is the effect, for example, of a 
major technological catch up by the East Asian economies on unemployment in 
Europe and America? With many socialist economies including the People's 
Republic of China with a population of over a billion people, the former Soviet Union 
as well as the economies of Eastern Europe integrating into the world trading system, 
how might it affect the welfare including job prospects of the NICs as well as the 
Newly Exporting Countries (NECs) of Asia as well as the Western economie~?~ This 
paper seeks to apply this modem theory of the natural rate of unemployment to the 
'Phelps (1990) gives an informal discussion of this class of models collectively dubbed the 
structuralist or modem-equilibrium school while Phelps (199 1) reviews evidence in support of 
this theory. It should be said that the theory referred to over here differs from, although it is 
related to, the structuralist theory of Taylor (1983). The latter focuses on macroeconomic 
interaction between the developing economies and the developed economies and consists 
largely of monetary models. The former class of models, on the other hand, are largely non- 
monetary in nature and have, as a major building block, a locus of the equilibrium rates of 
unemployment endogenously derived. 
S e e  Fields (1985) for empirical evidence. 
4The NECs are a second tier of developing economies which rely upon the export of 
manufactures to accelerate growth and include countries like Indonesia, Malaysia, the 
Philippines and Thailand. 
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global economy to analyze these  problem^.^ 
Some rather useful findings of the behavior of the natural rates of unemployment in 
the world economy are ~btained.~ Harrod-neutral or Hicks-neutral technical progress 
across all industries in Asia is shown to lead to a terms of trade improvement for 
America but raises the latter's unemployment rate so that America's overall welfare 
may decline.' The integration of the former socialist economies into the world goods 
market drives up the equilibrium rates of unemployment in stylized Asia and 
America. Protection by America is also shown to save American jobs but raises the 
unemployment rate in Asia.' 
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we set up the basic model. 
Section 3 examines the impact on the world economy of various shocks including 
Harrod-neutral as well as Hicks-neutral technical progress in Asia, protection in 
America and the integration of the former socialist economies into the world 
economy. We also derive a measure of the welfare of a representative worker in the 
context of endogenous unemployment. Section 4 contains some concluding remarks. 
2. THE BASIC MODEL 
In this section, we first develop the autarkic equilibrium before characterizing the 
free trade equilibrium. The set-up here is simpler than that used in Hoon (1991) in 
focusing entirely on the steady-state. The closed-economy equilibrium is essentially 
that of Shapiro-Stiglitz (1984) extended to consider more than one sector. 
A. The Basic Shirking Model in Autarky 
There are number of workers in the closed economy with each worker being risk 
neutral, and having the instantaneous utility function c - e where c = c;c;-'', 0 < 77 < 1. 
Here c,, c, are the per capita consumption levels of goods X and Y,  respectively, and e 
5The present paper builds upon my earlier Hoon (1991) paper to study the impact of various 
shocks to the global system. There, the central result proved was that free trade involving Asia 
exporting the labor-intensive good lowers Asian unemployment rate but raises the American 
unemployment rate. 
Tn the paper, we interpret loosely our stylized Asia to exclude the former and current 
socialist economies and hence exclude the People's Republic of China, and include in our 
stylized America most of Western Europe. 
'This prediction stands in contrast to that of the traditional model where America must 
unambiguously gain from Harrod-neutral or Hicks-neutral technical progress across all 
industries in Asia. 
81n the classic Stolper and Samuelson (1941) paper, while protection by the labor scarce 
country raises workers' real wages unambiguously, it cannot be said that any jobs are saved 
since full employment in their model always prevails. In the model we develop here where 
endogenous job rationing occurs, we demonstrate that protection of the labor-intensive sector 
indeed reduces the economy-wide equilibrium unemployment rate. 
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is the effort level9. We assume that e can take only two values, zero if no effort is 
supplied (when the worker shirks) and a positive constant, otherwise. The worker is 
indifferent between working in either sector so that, in equilibrium, wage levels will 
be equalized across sectors.'O In addition, we assume that the worker has ownership of 
another factor, capital, which provides him a source of nonwage income." Each 
worker maximizes the expected present value of lifetime utility, V,  with a subjective 
hscount rate equal to p. 
We first consider the decision problem of a worker whether or not to shirk when he 
is employed.I2 Let V,,, V,, denote the expected present value of utility in the case 
when he shirks and when he does not. Let V, be the expected present value of utility 
if unemployed. We want to derive the condition under which V,, will exceed V,, so 
that it will be optimal for the worker not to shirk. By solving a simple dynamic 
programming problem, we can show that V,, and V,, satisfy the following equations: 
In (1) and ( 2 ) ,  p is the subjective discount rate; b is the separation rate (due to 
exogenous reasons other than shirking) and is the same for all firms; and g is the 
probability of being caught if shirking (also exogenous). The fundamental asset 
equations (1) and (2) are of the form "interest rate times asset value equals flow 
benefits (dividends) plus expected capital gains (or losses)." The flow benefit in (1) is 
the flow utility from consumption, c; the expected capital gain (actually loss) is 
probability of job loss for a shirker (b + g) times the amount of utility lost by 
becoming unemployed, V, - V,,. Equation (2) has a similar interpretation. 
Now the worker solves the period by period problem: maximize c - e subject to 
'Any homothetic utility function will leave our results unchanged. 
1°A different model in Bulow and Summers (1986) derives interindustry wage differentials 
from assuming that efficiency-wage considerations are important only in one sector. Our 
analysis shows that even when there are no interindustry wage differentials, there may be a role 
for trade policy to raise national welfare. Some other papers directed at examining the 
problems of trade and unemployment are Brecher (1974, 1992) and Copeland (1989). Brecher 
examines a small open economy in his papers while Copeland studies a Ricardian trade model. 
"We assume that the total stock of capital is roughly constant in the time period under 
consideration. 
"We follow Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) in generating a pseudo-labor supply locus through 
introducing the shirking behavior of workers. Another story of the labor market which 
generates a pseudo-labor supply locus in the context of imperfect information is the labor- 
turnover model of Salop (1979). Neoclassical schemes such as bonding to deal with the 
problem of shirking and labor turnover are assumed not to be viable due to problems of moral 
hazard and capital market imperfections. Katz (1986) gives an evaluation of the empirical 
evidence relevant to efficiency-wage models. 
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- 
pxcx +p,c,  = w + rk,  where it is implicitly assumed that the worker is unable to 
borrow or lend. Here p, is the price of good X,  p, is the price of good Y, w is the wage 
I level, r is the rental rate, and k is the quantity of capital owned by the worker, assum- 
ing that capital is divided equally among all workers. Solving the worker's period 
optimization problem, we derive the indirect utility function @(w+rk)p;qp;(l-q)-e 
for the non-shirker and @ ( ~ + r k ) ~ ; q ~ , " - q '  for the shirker where @= q q ( l -  ~ ) l - ~ ,  the 
marginal utility of income, is a positive constant. An appropriate normalization is to 
set the price index pJpf-'" to unity so that we treat the typical bundle of goods in the 
consumption basket as numeraire. 
Substituting the indirect utilities of the shirker and non-shirker into ( 1 )  and (2), we 
obtain 
In order for it not to be worthwhile for the worker to shirk, it is necessary that V, I 
V,,. From (3)  and (4),  this condition can be stated as 
The firm by raising the wage level raises the worker's indirect utility and provides 
him an incentive not to shirk. There is, however, no reason for the firm to pay more 
than necessary to prevent shirking. Thus (5 )  holds with equality, and no worker 
shirks. 
The expected discounted value of utility for an unemployed worker must obey the 
asset equation: 
where a is the accession rate, the rate at which the unemployed gain employment. 
Notice from (6 )  that the worker continues to own income from rents even though he is 
unemployed, giving rise in this case to the indirect utility function ~ ( r k ) .  Using (5 )  
with the equality sign and (6), we obtain 
In steady state, the accession rate can be expressed as: 
bN 
a = -  - 
b(1- U )  
L - N  U 
where L is the size of the labor force, N is the number of employed workers and ( 1  - 
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U )  = N I z is the rate of employment. Substituting (8) into (7), we finally obtain our 
aggregate no-shirking constraint (NSC): 
The NSC says that the lower the rate of unemployment, and thus the shorter the 
expected time spent in unemployment if fired, the more tempting it is to shirk. To 
avoid this, firms must offer a higher wage level. The supply wage, that is, the 
minimum wage the firm has to offer to induce nonshirking behavior by hired 
employees, therefore, rises as the unemployment rate declines. Notice that the 
aggregate no-shirking constraint does not depend upon the rental rate. This results 
from assuming homothetic tastes as well as from assuming that workers obtain their 
rental incomes from renting their capital to the firms whether they are employed or 
not. The NSC in this model takes the place of the labor supply curve in the standard 
model of the labor market. It is also known as the pseudo-labor supply locus. 
Turning now to the production side of the model, we let the production functions 
be given by 2, =Fx (K,, e m , )  and 2, = F, (K,, e m , )  where the production functions 
exhibit constant re_turns to s@e. Letting fx (< ) = F, (k,  , 1 )  and f, (k,  ) = F, ( j , ,  1 )  with 
the properties: fi'(ki) > 0 ,  Af'(ki) < 0; i = x,y, we may write zx = ( 1 -  U ) e h ,  fx(kx),  and z ,  
= ( 1  - ~ ) e h ,  f,(k,), where z ,  = 2, 1 z is the per capita output of sector X, A being a 
measure of Harrod-neutral technical progress and z, = Z, / z i s  the per capita output of 
sector Y. Here n, = N, IN and n, = N, IN are the shares of employed labor force 
allocated to sectors X and Y, respectively; and = K,  I ( e m x  ) and k, = K,  I ( e m ,  ) 
are the sectoral capital-efficiency labor ratios, respectively. (We use a tilde to 
represent a variable expressed in efficiency units.) 
The demand for capital and labor by each firm gives rise to (10)  and ( 1  1 ) :  
Equation (10)  tells us that labor is allocated to each sector in such a way that 
demand wages are equalized across the two sectors. Similiarly, rental rates are also 
equalized across the two sectors. It is useful to derive a few relationships from (10)  
and (1 1 ) .  Dividing ( l o )  by ( 1  I ) ,  we show that 
where 6 = w I ( eAr )  is the efficiency wage-rental ratio. In other words, the sectoral 
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capital-efficiency labor ratios are increasing functions of the efficiency wage-rental 
ratio. From (lo), we can also show that 6 = 6(p) where p = px 1 p, . To determine the 
sign of the relationship between p and 6, we note using (10) and (1 1) that 
Without any loss of generality, we assume that sector X is relatively labor-intensive 
implying that kx < ky for all efficiency wage-rental ratios. It follows that an increase 
in p raises 6. 
To link the efficiency wage-rental ratio to the wage, substitute (12) into (10) to 
obtain 
using the relationship, px = p'l-q'. From (15) we obtain a relationship between the 
wage and the relative price as well as the technology parameter: 
We, therefore, obtain a relationship linking the demand wage to the goods relative 
price and the technology parameter, w = w(A,p) such that dw / dA > 0 and & / dp > 0. 
To close the model, we need the condition that the total sectoral labor allocation be 
equal to the aggregate employment, as well as the condition that capital be fully 
employed. We choose to express these conditions as 
Equating the demand wage given by w = w(A, p) to the supply wage given by (9), 
we obtain: 
Equation (20) can be described as the labor market equilibrium locus where the 
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demand wage has been equated to the supply wage, and gives a positive relationship 
between the relative price of the relatively labor-intensive good, p, and the current rate 
of employment, 1 - U. The higher the rate of employment is, the less costly it is to be 
fired, and thus the greater is the incentive to shirk. To induce non-shirking behavior, 
firms need to offer a higher wage level. With an unchanging technology parameter, it 
is profitable to offer a higher wage only if firms face a higher relative price for the 
relatively labor-intensive good. We note that the third term in the bracket of the 
expression on the RHS of (20) is the sum of the accession rate and exogenous 
separation rate divided by the probability of being caught shirking. When 1 - U = 1, 
that is, when there is full employment, the accession rate is infinitely large, and we 
require an infinitely high wage to induce non-shirking behavior. This corresponds to 
an infinitely high relative price for the labor-intensive good. The labor market 
equilibrium locus relating the relative price, p, to the rate of employment, 1 - U, will 
be a positively-sloped schedule in the employment-relative price plane shown in 
Figure 1. An increase in A will shift rightward the locus, that is, to raise the 
employment rate for any p. We summarize this relationship as ~-u=@(P; 11); @ >0, 
P 
@, >O where @, =d@ldp, etc. 
Figure 1 
TRADE AND THE EQUILIBRIUM RATE 2 1 
We wish to derive the relative per capita supplies of goods X and Y as well. 
Making use of (18) and (19), we may write the production functions as 
eA(1- ~ ) k ,  - k k - e ~ ( 1 -  ~ ) k ,  
z , = [  - - l f ,  6, ); z, = [ k, - i, I f, (i,) k, - k, 
where z,, z, are the per capita output levels of goods X and Y, respectively. We obtain, 
after dividing, 
5 = [ -  eA(1- U)a,  - ( k  / f,) 
( k  I f,) - eA(1- U)a,  I ,  z, 
where we define ai = k, / A ( & ) ;  i = x ,y  as the inverse of the average physical 
productivity of capital in sector i. Under the assumptions made earlier that fi> 0, 
Ark 0, we have a,r(ki) > 0. From ( 2 1 ) ,  we obtain the following deriG'&idq:) 
l ap  > 0 and / z, ) / d(1- U )  > 0. The output relationships can be summarized 
in reduced form as follows: 
- az, JZ, az, az, 
Z ,  = z , ( p , l - U ; k , A ) ;  ->0,- >O,-<O,->O; dp d(1 - U )  dk aA 
- az, az, az 
my < 0, -> 0, 2 < 0. z, = z,(p, 1 - U;  k ,  A); - < 0,- dp d(1 - U )  ak aA 
To determine the relative of good X in autarky, we need to clear the domestic 
goods market. Now the individual demand functions are given by c, = q ( w  + rk)p;' 
and c, = (1 - q ) ( w  + rk )p i l  for those workers who are employed, and c, = qrkp;' and 
c, = ( 1  - 17)rkp,1 for those who are unemployed. Aggregating across all individuals, 
the per capita aggregate demand functions c, and c, are given by c, = ~ [ ( l -  U ) w  + r k ]  
p-"-q' and c,  = (1 - q ) [ ( l -  U ) w  + rklpq,  respectively. Dividing, we obtain 
so that relative per capita aggregate demands are independent of incomes. (This is 
simply the result of homothetic tastes which we are adopting here.) 
The requirement for the goods markets to clear gives us the condition: 
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which can be interpreted as the product market equilibrium condition. In the 
employment rate-relative price plane in Figure 1, this schedule is downward-sloping 
since differentiation of (25) yields i 
Joint equilibrium in the labor and product markets yields the equilibrium values of p 
and 1 - U. 
B. The Free Trade Equilibrium I 
In the spirit of the Heckscher-Ohlin theory, we assume that Asia and America are 
identical except for relative factor endowments." The latter is defined in terms of the 
ratio of capital stock to the total number of workers (including both the employed as 
well as unemployed workers), that is, the ratio of capital to the total labor force. We 
make the following assumption: Asia is relatively labor abundant whereas America is 
relatively labor scarce. Thus, 
where kis  the amount of capital per unit of labor force in Asia. (An asterisk is used to 
denote an American variable.) 
To depict the free trade equilibrium (compared to the autarkic equilibrium) of the 
two economies, it is useful to develop a back-to-back diagram characterizing the 
labor-market equilibrium locus in one quadrant, and the determination of the product 
market-clearing relative price in the other. To determine the autarkic equilibrium 
relative price and the corresponding unemployment rate in this new diagram, we can 
substitute the reduced form relationship 1 - U = $@;A) into (21) to give us 
'Clearly, we can allow a large number of parameters to differ between Asia and America, 
namely, the measure of technical progress (A), the pure rate of time preference (p ) ,  the 
exogenous rate of worker separation for reasons other than shirking (b) and the detection rate 
(g). The reader will, without difficulty, see how the results in this section change when proper 
account is taken of these differences. 
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where the dependence of 1 - U on p through the reduced form relationship is made 
explicit. Expression (27) can, in turn, be substituted into the goods market-clearing 
relationship (25) to give us 
It is straightforward to check that the righthand term in (28) decreases in p and is 
described by RR in Figure 2. The autarkic rate of equilibrium employment is denoted 
as 1 - U,. 
RR* I I 
Figure 2 
In America, the reduced form equation characterizing the labor market equilibrium 
is given by 1 - U* = $*(p*; A*). Substituting this expression into America's goods 
market-clearing condition, and noting that only relative factor endowments differ 
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between the two economies, we obtain 
With k* > k, the righthand term described by RR* lies above RR. The implied higher 
relative price p* means that in autarky, America enjoys a higher equilibrium rate of 
employment (denoted by 1 - in Figure 2), and correspondingly, higher real wages. 
Assuming identical and homothetic tastes, the world market-clearing condition 
under free trade is given by 
where we substitute the appropriate reduced form expressions 1 - U = @p) and 1 - U* 
= @*(p), noting that under free trade p = p*. Here, s, = z / ( z  + ), that is, sL is Asia's 
share of the world labor force. The free trade equilibrium relative price lies between 
the two autarkic relative prices. We let RR, in Figure 2 represent the righthand 
expression of the global market-clearing condition (30). As evident from Figure 2, 
the equilibrium rate of employment under free trade denoted by 1 - Uf is higher 
(compared to autarky) for Asia but lower for America.14 
C. A Welfare Measure 
The welfare of a representative worker can be represented by his expected indirect 
utility v(p,, p,, I )  where I is the expected income of a worker. Here, v depends upon 
the probability of the worker being employed and is given by @[(I - U)w + rklpxq 
p,'l-V' where I = (1 - U)w + rk. We measure the worker's welfare change by du where 
& Next, we use the fact that I = (1 - U)w + rk = pxzx + p,z,, and Roy's identities - - 
dx dpX 1 - = c, , etc. to obtain 
dI 
14Hoon (1991) proved this result for a model that allowed for dynamics in the evolution of 
the employment rate. It is also straightforward to prove that Asia has comparative advantage in 
the relatively labor-intensive good. 
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recalling that p2pi-q = 1. The first two terms of (31) give us the usual gains from the 
terms of trade improvement while the third term (in bracket) indicates the shift in the 
production possibilities curve resulting from various shocks we subsequently 
examine. l5  
3. ECONOMIC SHOCKS IN THE TWO-COUNTRY WORLD 
We apply the two-country general-equilibrium model developed in the last section 
to the examination of the effects of economic shocks on the behavior of the natural 
rates of unemployment in the two countries. 
A. Harrod-Neutral Technical Progress in Asia 
PROPOSITION 1: An increase in Harrod-neutral technical progress across all 
industries in the labor-abundant country unambiguously raises the equilibrium rate of 
unemployment of its trading partner. 
Suppose that there is a positive Harrod-neutral technological shock across all 
industries in Asia, that is, there is a rise in the parameter A.16 Competitive equilibrium 
requires that at any given relative goods price, the demand wage level firms find 
profitable to offer should rise. The higher wage is consistent with a decline in the 
equilibrium rate of unemployment in Asia at the original price vector. We refer to this 
as the "primary effect" of the shock. At the given world terms of trade, there must, in 
fact, be a contraction in the world supply of good Y and an increase in the supply of 
good X. The increase in the world relative supply of good X drives down the relative 
price of good X ,  p. 
To formally prove this, we differentiate through the global goods market-clearing 
condition (30) to obtain 
where 
lSNote that with the wage level equalized across all industries, we have well-behaved 
transformation curves. The latter, however, shift endogenously in response to variations in p 
through the effect of p on 1 - U. 
T o r  simplicity, we assume that the increase is uniform across all industries. 
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We see that the denominator, A is positive but the numerator is negative. 
In terms of Figure 2, the reader can check that there is a downward-shift in the RR, 
schedule corresponding to a downward shift of RR and a downward shift of LL, 
implying a lower p in the new trade equilibrium. From the expressions, 1 - U* = 9. (p ) ;@i  > 0 and 1 - U = @ ( p ; A ) ; @ ,  > 0,@, > 0,we see that the equilibrium rate of unem- 
ployment in America rises although the effect in Asia is ambiguous. This is because 
the increase in relative supply of good X in the world brings about a relative price 
change which tends to offset somewhat the expansionary impact of the positive 
technological shock which occurs in Asia. We term this the "secondary effect." In 
America, however, there is a pure terms of trade effect which depresses the wage level 
there, and results in a rise in the equilibrium rate of unemployment. Thus, a positive 
Harrod-neutral technological shock in Asia leads to a rise in America's equilibrium 
unemployment despite a terms of trade improvement. The welfare of the 
representative American worker can be expressed as 
noting that under free trade, p* = p. The first two terms are positive but the third 
bracketed term is negative since the induced rise in equilibrium unemployment shifts 
in the American transformation curve." 
B. Hicks-Neutral Technical Progress in Asia 
PROPOSITION 2: A uniform increase in Hicks-neutral technical progress in the 
labor-intensive sector'alone or across all industries in the labor-abundant country 
unambiguously raises the equilibrium rate of unemployment for its trading partnel: A 
Hicks-neutral technical progress in the capital-intensive sector alone, however, 
improves the employment prospects of its trading partner. 
Suppose, on the other hand, that Hicks-neutral technical progress occurs across all 
industries in Asia which we represent with a rise in the parameter n. For simplicity, 
we set in the earlier section A = 1 and e = 1. We may now represent the production 
"In his empirical work, Lilien (1982) has argued that increased foreign competition in 
manufactured goods has been one of the important sectoral shocks facing the U. S. economy in 
the seventies to early eighties. 
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functions as Z, = IIF, (K, , N,) and Z, = RF, (K, , N,). Such a uniform increase in 
Hicks-neutral technical progress across all industries raises the wage level and rental 
rate proportionately .leaving the wage-rental ratio unaffected. It can easily be checked 
that we obtain the reduced form w = $ ( n ,  p)  where both partial derivatives are 
positive. Also, 1 - U = Q; n) with both partial derivatives positive. Similiarly, 1 - 
U* = @@; n*) with both partial derivatives positive. It is straightforward to prove 
that an increase in II raises z, /zy through raising 1 - U at any given relative goods 
price so that the consequences on Asia and America are much as before. Formally, 
we check that 
where A is' defined as earlier. We note that the numerator is negative since &, > 0, 
dz, 1 d$ < 0 and sL{sLz, +(l-sL)z:)dzy 1 dn-sL{sLzy +(l -sL)z~)dzx  / dl7 < 0. The sign of 
the final term follows from the fact that dz, ldn= f,, dz, /cXI= f,, and . 
Hence, a uniform increase in Hicks-neutral technical progress across all industries in 
Asia has qualitatively the same results on unemployment as a Harrod-neutral technical 
progress discussed in the last section. 
On the other hand, we may allow the index of Hicks-neutral technical progress 
across the two sectors to differ as in the paper by Findlay and Grubert (1959). It is 
easy to show that we derive the reduced form w = w(&, II,, p) where ll, is the Hicks- 
neutral technological measure in sector X and n, applies to sector Y. The following 
derivatives hold: dw 1 dn, > 0, dw 1 an, < 0 and dw 1 dp > 0. Suppose then that there is 
a Hicks-neutral technical progress which occurs only in the relatively labor-intensive 
good sector in Asia, that is, a rise in II,. At the given world terms of trade, the wage 
level rises, and expands Asian employment. The world economy at the original price 
vector is faced with an excess supply of the labor-intensive good which requires a 
cheapening of good X. The result is a downward movement along the labor market 
equilibrium locus in America and hence a bulging of American ~nemployment.'~ 
Formally, we have 
I 18Almost identical results obtain when labor-saving technical advance occurs in the labor- 
intensive good sector of Asia. This exercise may be relevant to the booming East Asian 
economies which, faced with tight labor market constraints, engage in industrial restructuring 
involving the use of labor-saving devices in the labor-intensive good sector. 
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which is negative since dzx/dll,> 0 and dz,/dllx< 0. 
We will leave it as an exercise for the reader to show that when Hicks-neutral 
technical progress occurs only in the capital-intensive good sector in Asia, that is, 
there is an increase in ny, America experiences a terms of trade deterioration but a 
decline in its equilibrium rate of unemployment. 
C. Integration of Socialist Economies into World Market 
PROPOSITION 3: When a third country which is the most labor-abundant in the 
world economy joins the trading system, it raises the rates of unemployment in all the 
less labor-abundant countries. 
Suppose that the block of current and former socialist economies joins the world 
trading system. It can be seen that being the most labor-abundant economy, it 
becomes the world net supplier of the labor-intensive good. Continuing to assume 
identical and homothetic tastes in all countries, the world terms of trade is now 
determined by 
where sLj is country j's share of the world labor force. The new world market-clearing 
p must be lower than that prevailing before the integration of the socialist economies 
into the world trading system. In terms of Figure 2, we would be able to draw a new 
RR, corresponding to the righthand side of (33) which lies below the original RR,. 
America, being the most capital abundant country, continues to be the world's net 
exporter of the capital-intensive good, and enjoys a terms of trade improvement but 
suffers a rise in unemployment. In terms of (32), the first two terms are positive but 
the third bracketed term is negative. For Asia, there are two possible equilibria. In 
one equilibrium, it remains a net exporter of the labor-intensive good and hence 
suffers both a terms of trade worsening as well as a rise in equilibrium unemployment. 
In terms of (31), all three terms are negative. On the other hand, it may be driven to 
be a net exporter of the capital-intensive good while suffering a rise in unemployment. 
D. Protection in America 
PROPOSITION 4: Protection in the labor-scarce country raises the natural rate of 
unemployment in the labor-abundant country. In the absence of the Metzler paradox, 
the protecting country experiences a decline in the natural rate of unemployment. 
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In the context of full-employment models, there is little validity in the argument 
that protection saves jobs.19 In our model where the natural rate of unemployment is 
no longer a constant but an endogenous variable which depends on the supply and I 
~ 
demand conditions in the world economy, we see a channel through which protection 
can affect the world market-clearing relative goods price which, in turn, can shift 
conditions to favor the demand for workers in America. Referring to our two-country 
Asia-America model, we let America impose a tariff on good X, starting from an 
initial free trade situation, so that now p: =(l+r)p, where 7 is the ad valorem tariff 
rate. At the given world terms of trade, (16) implies that the wage level in America is 
higher stimulating employment. Also, z: lz; rises while c: /c; declines. An import 
tarrif imposed in America, therefore, leads to a decline in the world relative demand 
for good X and an increase in the world relative supply of good X. Accordingly, we 
experience a decline in the world relative price of good X. In Asia, the impact is to 
cause a rise in the natural rate of unemployment; in America, however, in the absence 
of the Metzler paradox, the domestic relative price has shifted so as to raise the wage 
offers to workers. American wages rise, as Stolper-Samuelson showed in 1941, 
reflecting an increase in the demand for labor but now there is also a decline in the 
natural rate of unemployment. Formally, the decline in the world relative price p can 
be shown as 
where we evaluate the derivative at an intial free trade equilibrium with z = 0 and we 
note that p* = (1 + r)p. The first term in the derivative gives the effect of the tariff in 
expanding the world relative supply of good X while the second term gives the effect 
of the tariff in contracting the world relative demand for good X at the original price 
vector. The total effect of the tariff is to cause a deterioration in the terms of trade as 
well as a rise in equilibrium unemployment for Asia. 
The change in welfare of a representative worker in America under protection is 
given by 
I9The traditional argument is laid out in Blinder (1987). 
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where m: = c: -z: is America's per capita import of good X and I* = p:z: + p;z; + zp: 
m* 20 
.. 
The first term gives us (absent the Metzler paradox) the loss to consumers from 
paying a higher price for imports although the world relative price for imports is now 
lower; the second term gives the gains from terms of trade improvement; the third 
bracketed term gives us the outward shift of the transformation schedule resulting 
from a lower equilibrium rate of unemployment, while the fourth term gives us the 
increase in tariff revenue. The third term captures the effect of the employment 
creating role of protecting a labor-intensive import-competing sector. The tariff 
imposed raises the real wages of workers, and shifts outwards the economy-wide 
demand for labor which juxtaposed against the pseudo-labor supply curve implies a 
decline in equilibrium unemployment. This channel is absent in the traditional model. 
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
We have filled in an important gap in the trade literature by providing a tractable 
model with which to analyze the impact on equilibrium unemployment of free trade 
and economic shocks in a two-country world econ~my.~' This we have done primarily 
by incorporating a theory of the efficiency-wage labor market into an otherwise 
traditional Heckscher-Ohlin trade model so that endogenous job rationing results. In a 
world economy where informational imperfections characterize national labor 
markets, an incentive constraint taking the form of the nonshirking constraint has to 
be satisfied. The equilibrium rate of unemployment in each economy has to endoge- 
nously adjust in response to shocks to the global general-equilibrium system. 
A number of positive predictions of the model have been derived along with a 
characterization of overall welfare effects. We showed that Harrod or Hicks-neutral 
technical progress across all industries in Asia lowers Asian unemployment but raises 
America's unemployment. In the traditional trade model, this shock must 
unambiguously favor America through the latter's improvement in its terms of trade. 
In our model, however, this welfare gain must be weighed against the welfare loss 
resulting from higher unemployment. Hicks-neutral technical progress in Asia's 
capital-intensive good sector, on the other hand, improves American job prospects 
although the latter experiences a terms of trade deterioration. The integration of the 
block of socialist economies based upon exports of the labor-intensive good into the 
world market creates jobs for these former socialist economies but worsens job 
l0We also use the following relationships: p:p:-q = 1, p; = p, andp: = (1 + z)p, . 
='In the context of high unemployment, Blinder (1988) recently issued a call for trade 
theorists to develop models of trade which explicitly deal with unemployment. We hope to 
have met this challenge in some way. 
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prospects for the less labor-abundant countries. If Asia remains a net exporter of the 
relatively labor-intensive good, it faces both a rise in unemployment as well as a terms 
of trade deterioration. Finally, protection in America saves American jobs but raises 
Asia's unemployment rate. 
Traditionally, international economics has developed by separating itself into two 
sub-disciplines: "real" trade theory, and international macroeconomics. Such a 
division has been useful from the point of view of pedagogy but perhaps misleads one 
to imagine that all the insights one draws from trade theory, from Ricardo to 
Samuelson to Krugman have nothing to say about the important problem of 
unemployment. It is hoped that this paper demonstrates that pure trade theory has 
something important and useful to say about the problem of persistently high 
unemployment-a problem which has plagued the developed world for nearly a 
decade now." 
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